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Scholars have treated “bottom-up” transitional justice processes as a non-nuanced whole, 
situating grassroots actors in direct opposition to large-scale, or “top-down,” approaches to 
transitional justice. Such an analysis is limited because it fails to take into account complex 
contextual factors that contribute to the ways in which bottom-up mechanisms manifest. 
Colombia and Guatemala are two cases in which bottom-up actors have strived to influence the 
ways in which peace and justice were articulated by their respective governments; however, the 
methods and outcomes are strikingly different. In Guatemala, grassroots actors sought to achieve 
ethnic inclusion, neglecting class and land-based demands. Colombia’s grassroots groups, 
however, have favored an anti-hegemonic approach through which bottom-up actors seek to 
redefine transitional justice in anti-hegemonic terms, frequently favoring radical land reform and 
redistribution and opposing neoliberal forms of post-conflict development. I argue that there are 
three primary variables influencing how bottom-up actors in Colombia and Guatemala responded 
to civil conflict and articulated transitional justice: 1. The ethnic nature of the conflict and the 
delineation of victims and perpetrators. 2. The countries’ respective access to resources 3. The 
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 Guatemala and Colombia are two countries that have embraced elements of bottom-up 
transitional justice, thereby incorporating community-specific endeavors meant to create a more 
lasting and stable post-conflict order. There are, however, important differences between the two 
countries’ mechanisms and desired outcomes: In Guatemala, activists took a conservative 
approach friendly to neoliberal notions of transitional justice, largely choosing not to strive for 
land or class-based reforms. Following the country’s civil conflict, grassroots groups did 
encourage ethnic inclusion; however, the nature of their demands were not radically indigenous-
centered, and the state retained power over who was considered a “good” or “bad” indigenous 
Maya dependent upon openness to market-oriented approaches to post-conflict recovery (Vogt 
2015). In Colombia, on the other hand, bottom-up approaches to transitional justice remain anti-
hegemonic and opposed to neoliberal forms of development and extraction (Diaz 2008). 
Colombia’s methods frequently revolve around use and access to land.  
 In 2016, the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia , or FARC) signed a historic peace agreement 
ending what was characterized as the “longest-running armed conflict in the Western 
Hemisphere” (International Center for Transitional Justice). The FARC agreed to pursue political 
representations through traditional institutional channels, symbolically laying down their arms 
and preparing to re-enter civilian life. During the past five years since the peace treaty was 
signed, however, domestic peace remains elusive: More than 1,000 human rights leaders have 
been killed, and the military continues to carry out abuses on the civilian population (Power 
2020). 1,400 agreements within the peace treaty have yet to be fulfilled (Campo Palacios & Dest 
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2020). As a result of the perceived failures of the 2016 Peace Accords, various grassroots groups 
have opposed the state’s interpretation of transitional justice, underscoring the state’s 
unreliability through refusal to participate in traditional political channels.  
 Guatemala formally ended its thirty-year civil war in 1996. The majority of the 200,000 
victims were Mayan peasants, who were massacred at the hands of the Guatemalan military and 
their associated paramilitary groups (Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza 2008, 144). Guatemala’s post-
conflict process implemented bottom-up forms of transitional justice, emphasizing indigenous 
accounts of the violence, creating “opportunity structures” (Tarrow 1998), and granting marginal 
communities access to “elite allies” (Destrooper and Parmentier 2018, 323).  Unlike Colombia, 
however, where grassroots groups have positioned themselves as antagonistic to institutional 
transitional justice mechanisms, Guatemala has proven remarkably susceptible to international 
and national influence of a neoliberal character, even in cases in which it ultimately harmed 
indigenous rights efforts around the country.  
I argue that there are three primary variables through which to understand the differences 
in bottom-up approaches to transitional justice in Colombia and Guatemala. The first, and likely 
most vital, is the ethnic nature of the conflict and the delineation between who is a victim and a 
perpetrator. In Colombia, the multi-faceted nature of the conflict created a context in which 
various voices and interests were heavily impacted by the violence, decreasing the country’s 
capacity to create a unified narrative in which there were clear victims and perpetrators. As a 
result, bottom-up voices in Colombia have failed to create a single space or avenue for political 
participation, forcing them to rely on non-institutional means of participation. In Guatemala, the 
state carried out a “scorched earth” policy, with violence clearly aimed at the nation’s ethnic 
Maya. As a result, Guatemalan grassroot actors contributing to the peace process had a specific 
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framework in which to operate, which encouraged them to emphasize ethnic political inclusion 
and recognition over land and class-based reforms. 
The second variable involves the countries’ access to resources, which has shaped the 
conflicts in various ways. During Colombia’s civil conflict, armed groups such as the FARC 
were able to fund their actions and endeavors through the lucrative drug market, which 
contributed to their ability to maintain power and presence in areas with little state support 
(Vargas Meza 1998). Additionally, other armed actors, including the paramilitaries and criminal 
gangs, could rely on the illicit market for funding, contributing to the multivariate nature and 
perpetual continuation of the conflict (LeGrand 2003). Guatemala’s guerrilla forces had no such 
resources and were more easily defeated, making the Guatemalan military the primary armed 
actor in Guatemala’s civil conflict. Due to their lack of financial resources, Guatemalan Maya 
necessarily relied on international NGO support to rebuild their communities after the civil 
conflict. As a result, Guatemalan grassroots groups have frequently adopted a donor-driven 
approach, rendering more popular modes of mobilization infrequent (Edelman 2005).  
The third variable on which I will focus is how religion influences the conflict’s actors. 
Although not as prominent as it was during the 1970s, Catholic liberation theology still plays a 
role in the philosophy of Colombia’s grassroots actors, encouraging peace and autonomy through 
anti-imperialism and redistribution (Celis and Furio 2016). Neo-pentecostalism has spread 
throughout Guatemala, which encourages close adherence to conservative politics and Christian-
Cultural dominion, as well as an individual approach to peace and a “forgiveness”-centric vision 
on amnesty (Reu 2019). Evangelical missionaries have also villainized an explicitly Maya 
identity, condemning traditional practices as “evil” and discouraging radical reforms.  
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The following analysis seeks to contextualize the Guatemalan and Colombian post-
conflict cases, identifying differences in bottom-up approaches to transitional justice and 
considering possible explanations. Where scholars do focus on a bottom-up approach to 
transitional justice, they frequently focus exclusively on the importance of marginal inclusion 
and how bottom-up voices can impact a country’s prospects for peace. While important, such an 
analysis neglects the variations in bottom-up approaches that can occur dependent on a country’s 
context. Guatemala and Colombia make compelling comparative cases due to grassroots groups’ 
distinctly different responses to inter-country violence and can form a basis for how such 
















Towards a more robust theory of “bottom-up” transitional justice initiatives  
 
The goal of this essay is to understand nuances in bottom-up approaches to justice, 
therefore it is necessary to further elaborate on the term “from below” and determine precisely 
how it is understood differently from transitional justice efforts as organized, or imposed, “from 
above.” According to McEvoy and McGregor (2008), the term “from below” implies communal 
or civil society actors mobilizing towards a goal or resisting unwanted actions or interventions 
from outside actors. Grassroots groups may assume an antagonistic stance towards “powerful 
hegemonic political, social or economic forces” (3); however, “from below” does not necessitate 
direct resistance (as will be demonstrated by the Guatemala case), but may simply be 
mobilization by community groups organized by and for victims of conflict. “From-above,” by 
contrast, implies hegemonic understandings of transitional justice as imposed on victims of 
conflict, components of which may be upheld by international governing bodies or outside 
organizations.  
While the start of the Transitional Justice field in the Americas is largely attributed to the 
post-authoritarian transitions in the Southern Cone, and the processes that then followed, the first 
“phase” of transitional justice as it is currently defined began with the Nuremberg Trials after 
World War II (Paige 2009, 328). According to Teitel (2003), Putting Nazi war criminals on trial 
set an important precedent; however, as Paige states, “none of the actors involved would have 
described it as such” (2009, 328), and many of the war criminals were not ultimately tried. Paige, 
as well as McGregor (2008), attribute the creation of “transitional justice as a discourse” to the 
late-1980s and extending to the mid-1990s when transitional justice began to emerge as a 
scholarly field, as evidenced by the creation of the term (Paige 2009, 327) and broad political 
shifts away from authoritarianism (336). The dilemmas surrounding transitioning states led to the 
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development of a transitional justice field, which focused on the ethical and practical questions 
surrounding post-conflict and post-authoritarian modes of justice and reconstruction.  
As a result of increased attention to transitioning states and the appropriate methods of 
engaging with post-conflict and post-authoritarian reconstruction and justice, scholars widely 
studied the impact transitional justice mechanisms have on democracy, peace, and human 
rights.  A number of scholars (O’Donnell & Schmitter (1986), Sikkink & Walling (2007), and 
Dancy & Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2015), for example) demonstrate a link between democratization 
and national-level transitional justice initiatives; however, an analysis of democratic participation 
by marginal actors is outside the scope of their studies. Caldeira and Holston (1999) conclude 
that without the inclusion of marginalized sectors, a failure of “civil citizenship” can occur. 
While large-scale analysis of the links between democratization and transitional justice 
initiatives is important, observing local processes and their impacts can help researchers better 
understand how post-conflict endeavors create local definitions of citizenship and democratic 
governance. If transitional justice mechanisms are to meet their goal of creating “a democratic 
political culture” (Carmody 2017, 211), then they must include the marginalized.  
Transitional Justice as a field was created to solve the “complex, legal, and practical 
questions” that arose from states recovering from repressive regimes and internal conflict (Paige 
2009, 324). Varying global experiences contributed to what Paige refers to as a “knowledge-
base” on how to “deal with the past” (324). While early approaches to the study of transitional 
justice focused primarily on large-scale initiatives and their impact on democracy, they gradually 
expanded to include “bottom-up” voices, incorporating the considerations of grassroots groups 
and addressing issues of community ownership of transitional justice processes (Arriaza and 
Roht-Arriaza 2008). I argue that expanding the knowledge-base to incorporate “bottom-up” 
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voices in the transitional justice process is not sufficient, and that it should be further expanded 
to closely analyze the localized understandings, contexts, and associated mechanisms behind 
why grassroots actors understand transitional justice in the way that they do. In-depth 
comparative analyses on grassroots transitional justice will illuminate the variations in bottom-up 
approaches dependent on a country’s conflict-based context.  
Top-down approaches have been typologized based primarily on the degree of amnesia 
imposed: to what degree are human rights violators punished for their crimes? Will truth 
commissions create a more stable peace? However, the top-down approach neglects to 
understand the varied and complex processes which occur at the grassroots level.  National level 
truth commissions, and UN brokered agreements and peace treaties, are objects of international 
attention; however, the ways in which smaller communities respond to periods of prolonged 
violence through negotiated ideas of justice, accountability, and memory should also be treated 
with a high degree of scholarly importance. While scholars have striven to understand the 
various types of top-down transitional justice methods, there is a knowledge gap on the nuances 













Colombia: Antagonistic Visions of Transitional Justice 
Background on the Conflict: Colombia’s State of Perpetual War 
 
The length, degree, and nature of Colombia’s conflict set it apart from others in the 
region. The magnitude of the country’s internal war have led some scholars to posit that 
Colombia a “culture of violence,” or an inclination towards perpetual war (Waldmann 2007). 
While much of the violence that has historically occurred in Latin America was under the reign 
of a military dictatorship, Colombia’s has taken place within a liberal democracy (LeGrand 
2003, 170). The origins of Colombia’s conflict is a subject of debate, with some scholars tracing 
it as far back as the bloody bipartisan battle between liberals and conservatives during what was 
called the War of a Thousand Days (LeGrand 171). The conflict lasted from 1899 to 1902, 
meaning that under such an estimate Colombia’s war persisted for more than a century. The 
more conservative estimate put forward in an 800-page report by Colombian historians considers 
the conflict’s beginning to be “La Violencia,” a decade-long period of bipartisan violence 
beginning in 1948 (Alsema 2015).  
The conflict at the center of “La Violencia” is one that continues to persist in Colombia’s 
ongoing fight: Inequality of access to land. In 1957, the Colombian state of Tolima’s head of 
agriculture, Hugo Pasquali, stated, “peace cannot be a reality without first establishing an 
equilibrium of property” (Sánchez 1992, 115). Colombian peasants have long been plagued by 
displacement, forcing them to reassert their rights to the land using squatter movements 
(LeGrand 1992), a practice which ultimately contributed to “La Violencia.” Persistent land issues 
and their surrounding conflicts gave rise to a number of guerrilla movements, all politically 
motivated by the peasants’ right to the land (Pizarro 1992). Amongst the multiple rebel groups 
which formed during this period, the FARC was largely the most politically experienced. They 
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formed slowly, developing strategically in response to the land disputes which continuously 
occurred between landowners and rural workers (Pizarro 1992, 182). As a result of its heavy 
involvement, FARC was able to gradually increase its regional control, developing relevance and 
political strength in the areas in which it carried out operations.   
The FARC formed in the 1960s, followed closely in the 1960s and 1970s by other well-
known guerrilla groups with similar ideological aims, such as the M-19 and the National 
Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, or ELN). All three of the guerrilla groups 
held goals related to land-reform and social justice for peasants (Felter and Renwick 2017). At 
the same time, the country was rotating power between the dominant Liberal and Conservative 
parties every four years as part of the National Front, which had formed in 1958. While the intent 
behind the National Front’s formation was to prevent violence, it left little space in which leftist 
groups could politically participate and institutionally combat elite landholdings. As a result, 
guerrilla groups relied on armed struggle. Initially, the FARC’s military power was limited; 
however, by the early 1980s, the group managed to control a great deal of land in the country’s 
southern territories (Vargas Meza 1998).  
Colombia’s conflict has been marked by a series of failed cease-fires and negotiations, 
one of which, occurring in 1983, demonstrated a series of changes and escalations to the war. 
The brief cease-fire and bout of negotiations emphasized political participation and 
acknowledged agrarian issues surrounding access to land, both of which were central 
components to the conflict. Unsurprisingly, Congress and Colombia’s oligarchy opposed the 
treaty, and the Unión Patriótica (UP), the Colombian Communist Party, faced widespread 
violence and intimidation at the hands of paramilitaries and narco-traffickers. Ultimately, a path 
to political participation for the FARC failed, and the violence continued to escalate (Vargas 
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Meza 1998). In 1985, the violence intensified further with the M-19 occupation of the Palace of 
Justice, an event that caused the death of about 100 individuals (Treaster 1985).  
During the 1980s, self-defense groups formed as a result of extortion and kidnapping 
threats from the guerrillas. By the 1990s, they morphed into well-organized paramilitary factions 
with external support both from the state and private entities (Power 2020). The escalation of 
paramilitary forces contributed greatly to the scale of the violence. According to the Colombian 
Center for Historical memory, paramilitary forces were behind the bulk of the war’s atrocities, 
and they carried out their acts with shocking brutality (Historical Memory Group 2016). Groups 
such as the Death to Kidnappers (Muertes a los Secuestradores or MAS) organized under the 
broader banner of the United Self-Defense group (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, or AUS), 
relying on increasingly shocking and indiscriminate tactics. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, 
paramilitary groups massacred civilians suspected of guerrilla ties, regardless of how loose or 
peripheral they may have been (Rozema 2008).  
It was also during the 1980s when narco-trafficking began to play a more central role in 
the war. While the guerrilla forces could initially rely on Soviet funding, it began to dwindle 
during this time. As a result, they increasingly relied on extortions, kidnappings, and the 
profitable drug trade to fund their endeavors (Vargas Meza 1998). Paramilitaries also relied on 
funds from cocaine production, and wealthy drug cartels launched attacks on civil and political 
infrastructure, social activists, politicians, and other public figures (Rampf & Chavarro 
2014).  Elites who feared a loss of political control formed alliances with the paramilitary 
groups, further exacerbating the nation’s violence and creating a crisis of political legitimacy. As 
a result, Colombians demanded a more viable political opening for armed factions, which was 
largely perceived as an anecdote to the ever-present violence in the country during the time. 
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Despite multiple attempts at political reform, including the creation of a new constitution in 
1991, political institutions remained flawed and incapable of addressing the nation's deepening 
crisis.  
In 2010, under the Juan Manuel Santos Presidency, dialogue between the FARC and the 
state was finally put forth as an alternative to the country’s long history of civil conflict. In 2012, 
in Havana, negotiations centered around key issues of the conflict and its recovery, including 
institutional political participation for the FARC, development policy, justice and reparations for 
victims of the conflict, drug policy, and reintegration (Gutierrez 2016). In 2016, the negotiations 
culminated in a comprehensive Peace Agreement, which was subsequently followed by a period 
of disarmament in which former combatants ceremoniously forfeit their weapons and prepared to 
again enter civilian life. Despite the early promise of the accords, peace has remained elusive and 


















Variable 1: The Multi-faceted Nature of Colombia’s Conflict  
 
The Colombian conflict’s multifaceted nature created a context in which various voices 
and interests were heavily affected by the violence, decreasing the country’s capacity to create a 
unified narrative in which there were clear victims and perpetrators. As a result, bottom-up 
voices in Colombia have failed to create a single space or avenue for political representation, 
forcing them to rely on non-institutional means of articulating common grievances. As the 
conflict’s history shows, the nature of the war was perpetually shifting, with the boundary 
between victim and perpetrator blurring throughout the course of the country’s long conflict. As 
a result, it was difficult for grassroots groups to organize on unified grounds, and it made 
creating a comprehensive peace agreement in which all victims were acknowledged, and the 
nature of the conflict clearly defined, difficult. Because the conflict was not fought along ethnic 
or religious grounds, grassroots groups have attempted to unify around the common cause of 
land use and restitution, which has often put them at odds with the Colombian government and 
other national or international interests.  
 
The Various Actors in the Colombian Civil War  
Colombia’s conflict was fought and formed by numerous domestic factions, including 
armed guerrillas, far-right paramilitaries, the armed forces, and those involved in the drug trade. 
International entities, such as private corporations and the US, also impacted the course of the 
war, contributing to its complexity. Because the conflict is so long-lasting, it has evolved to align 
with changing domestic forces within the country and with the international climate. While 
Colombia’s war was once a battle between guerrilla forces and the state, other armed groups 
began to contribute to the scale of the nation’s violence, which ultimately impacted all sectors of 
the population. While, like in most conflicts, the rural and urban poor likely suffered the most, 
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Colombian political and social elites were also targeted. The magnitude and scope of the conflict 
is difficult to grasp, with over 200,000 dead and more than 8.2 million displaced (World Report 
2021: Colombia).  
The primary guerrilla group in Colombia is the FARC, which is the largest in the world 
(Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas 2004). The ELN, the second largest guerrilla group in Colombia, 
shared similar ideological aims and tactics. Initially, when the civil war was a battle between 
guerrillas and the state, the guerrillas made little military progress, and the casualties of the war 
remained low. In the 1980s the conflict escalated and the murder rate soared into the early 2000s, 
which was attributable at least in part to the introduction of new actors. During the Cold War, 
Soviet States funded the guerrillas, allowing them to further solidify as ideologically-based 
military groups. As the Cold War ended, however, the guerrillas increasingly relied on extortion 
and kidnapping, which primarily targeted multinational enterprises and national elites (Restrepo, 
Spagat, and Vargas 2004). The US funded the counter-guerrilla operations and continued their 
influence well after the Cold War years. As a result of the complexity of the war, and the 
evolving and changing scale of the actors involved, the state’s response has been largely 
inadequate at addressing the war’s grievances. Its inability to cohesively define a specific victim 
or group of victims, and the difficulty of identifying a single perpetrator, has made the 
transitional justice process more challenging for institutions to carry out.  
In addition, the state’s ability (and willingness) to carry out justice is largely contingent 
upon Colombia’s extremely diverse geography, with much of the country’s “periphery” having 
little to no state presence. According to data by García Villegas and Espinosa, 60 percent of 
Colombian territory does not have access to state institutions (2015, 2). Because of the state’s 
inability to respond to the diverse needs of its population, 6 million citizens lack access to a 
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state-sanctioned political community. Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities are most 
likely to reside in areas without a state presence. As a result, communities have relied on illegal 
armed actors to mediate conflict and create governing institutions. There are a number of 
implications regarding the lack of state presence and how this has formed the grassroots response 
to transitional justice. For one, because geographically peripheral communities have relied on 
unofficial institutions for the duration of the conflict and likely after its formal end, they do not 
have a basis or history on which to base institutional participation. They have persistently been 
denied those avenues. Also, as a result of changing local dynamics and varying degrees of state 
support, control by armed actors, and community cohesion, an antagonism to a state-sanctioned 
peace process is to be expected. The state is unable to adequately articulate the needs of such a 
diverse population and cannot alone instigate recovery from a conflict so multi-faceted.  
The Colombian government has also had trouble responding to the evolving array of 
armed actors present in the conflict, making a negotiated peace challenging. While the 
Colombian government has historically focused its demilitarization tactics on the FARC, 
Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas’s data set (2004) demonstrates why the intensity of the conflict is 
the result of multiple intersecting actors rather than one particular guerrilla group. Beginning in 
1997, the paramilitaries began to escalate their anti-guerrilla operations, and both the guerrillas 
and paramilitaries targeted what they referred to as “civilian infrastructure,” attacking 
communities believed to be supporting one group over the other. Civilians demonstrating 
perceived support were considered military assets, and were thus considered legitimate targets by 
the warring factions. According to LeGrand (2003), paramilitaries are responsible for the 
majority of civilian murders and 70% of civilian displacements.  
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As paramilitary violence escalated throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, it became clear 
that an end to conflict required not only disarmament of, and negotiations with, guerrilla forces, 
but also with the paramilitaries. In 2003, President Álvaro Uribe initiated a disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process with the paramilitaries; however, the 
government continued its financial support of paramilitary groups and continued to offer them 
intelligence sharing (Franz 2016). There were also few, if any, consequences for those who did 
disarm. Punishment for former paramilitary combatants was limited to a maximum of eight years 
in prison, and money designated for reparations frequently went to the paramilitaries who 
disarmed rather than the victims who once suffered because of them (Rozema 2008).  
 President Uribe himself was believed to have military ties, and despite mild attempts at 
paramilitary disarmament, he increased his militarization against the FARC and any supposed 
sympathizers (Rozema 2008). The government’s strongly militarized stance against the FARC 
and comparatively mild stance against paramilitary combatants posed problems towards a lasting 
peace. Not only did it mean that the paramilitary atrocities were treated with less severity, it also 
meant that the increased militarization towards the FARC made the armed forces complicit in 
grave human rights violations. To make it appear as though the battle against the guerrillas was 
being effectively fought, the military carried out “false positives,” the practice of murdering 
civilians and framing them as combatants (World Report 2021: Colombia). Faith in the state was 
further eroded, and the ability for the government to condemn specific parties to the conflict was 
tainted. In addition, peasants in the Colombian countryside had difficulty airing grievances 
against one specific group, because they were simultaneously targeted by the state, 
paramilitaries, and the guerrillas.  
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The role of drug cartels and traffickers are not to be underestimated, as they also shaped 
the trajectory of the conflict by increasing the scope and magnitude of violence and allowing the 
conflict to continue (Espejo Duarte 2021). The war between the cartels and the state is 
considered by Espejo Duarte (2021) to be a separate conflict, a “non-conventional” violence in 
which the state can be stripped of its monopoly on violence and even territorial control. The 
significant degree to which the drug cartels in Colombia were able to influence the political 
sphere is also striking. The drug cartels are significant because they added a new layer to an 
already existing conflict; however, they also allowed the armed factions within the country (both 
guerrilla and paramilitary) to continue and even bolster their operations.  
While the Colombian government successfully broke apart the large and politically 
powerful drug cartels, the void created upon their defeat attracted new criminal gangs and 
existing guerrilla and paramilitary forces as armed actors sought to control the isolated regions in 
which cocaine was produced. The drug trade also encouraged increased US intervention. By 
1992, Colombia was the recipient of an abundance of US aid, with most of it going towards 
military affairs or the national police (Rochlin 2011). The US-backed “Plan Colombia” funded 
Colombia’s war on cocaine and its associated cartels. A cornerstone of the program was aerial 
fumigation of the coca crop, which has been widely condemned for negatively impacting the 
health of those near fumigation sites (Rochlin 2011). In addition, fumigation did nothing to 
create legal economic alternatives for the rural poor, ultimately bolstering support for guerrilla 
forces (Vargas Meza 1998). The above scenarios all demonstrate a war that was constantly 
evolving, making it difficult to adequately end. Demilitarization of the guerrillas would do little 
to address the other armed actors in the war, and the state’s response proved to be inadequate, as 
is demonstrated by the Victims’ Law. 
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The ANC and the The Victims’ Law: Incomplete Restitutions  
 In the 1990s, there was an attempted opening for political participation through the 
creation of a new constitution under President César Gaviria. The Constituent Assembly of 
Colombia (ANC) strived for a more complete and open democracy, and through it a path towards 
disarmament and eventual peace (Rampf & Chavarro, 2014). The 1991 constitution was an 
important acknowledgment of inequality of political representation, and it did attempt to address 
the need to include marginalized voices in the peace process. There were, however, important 
flaws in its implementation. While there were initial public hearings in various sectors of 
Colombian society, including guerrilla camps, participation remained unequal. Domination by 
intellectual elites, a limited list of “acceptable” topics for the assembly, and a marked absence of 
Afro-Colombian input were only a few of its limitations. Crucially, the government bombed the 
FARC headquarters Casa Verde leading up to the ANC elections, damaging the ongoing peace 
negotiations and discouraging the group from sending their own delegation to the assembly 
(Rampf & Chavarro 2014). The absence of FARC harmed the ANC’s prospects for genuine 
political inclusion.  
Implementation of the 1991 Constitution was flawed. Barriers to political participation 
persisted through, for example, discouraging the use of new legal mechanisms by making their 
application intentionally arduous (Rampf & Chavarro, 2014). Political elites formed new 
alliances with paramilitaries in an effort to protect their political influence, resulting in 
intimidation and violent attacks against social activists and movement leaders. While 
participation was theoretically encouraged in the new constitution, the actual practice remained 
dangerous, and new democratic spaces remained out of reach for many Colombians. The 1991 
ANC is an important moment in the Colombian conflict because it points to the limitations of a 
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singular attempt at inclusion of marginalized voices. While the assembly did attempt to obtain 
public input from various sectors of society, including those at the margins, it could not bear the 
burden of addressing a complex set of diverse participatory barriers in a country in which 
experiences and organizational approaches differed radically. Despite attempts at political 
inclusion, restrictive measures remained largely intact and institutional political participation 
remained out of reach for much of the population.  
 In 2011, there was another attempt towards peace through restitution for victims. Due to 
the high levels of displacement as a result of the Colombian conflict, land restitution and 
reparation is a central component to the country’s post-conflict plan. The Victims’ Law, or Law 
1448, was meant to provide displaced persons with access to land and to move concentrated 
landholdings from the control of drug barons (Montoya Londoño and Vallejo Mejía 2016). 
International actors influenced the law, with organizations such as The World Bank providing 
funds for its application (Unidad para las Víctimas). The law, which was the state’s way of 
acknowledging restitution as a necessary component of the peace process, was limited in what it 
could realistically achieve.  
 The Victims’ Law was unable to adequately compensate victims because it failed to 
address the multiple groups vying for control over resource-rich areas that were once home to a 
number of displaced persons. Victims were forced to prove their rightful ownership over the 
land, a task which was challenging for individuals who had been forced to flee (Montoya 
Londoño and Vallejo Mejia 2016). Rather than ending land-based conflict, new battles arose; 
cattle ranchers with paramilitary ties, national and international corporations, and displaced 
peasants all wanted a formalized claim to land. While the law appeared to benefit displaced 
people, it heavily contributed to “commercial rural development,” with the state considering 
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“modernization” a precondition for lasting peace (Montoya Londoño and Vallejo Mejia 2016). 
No matter the means with which owners had seized or occupied land, if the intended purpose 
was to carry out industrial agricultural projects, then victims could not reclaim that land. Instead, 
they were given compensation. In formulating and sponsoring the law, national and international 
elite actors failed to recognize the multitude of meanings place can have for victims of the 
conflict. While the Colombian government did adhere to international standards of justice in its 
transition towards peace, the frame in which it operated was insufficient on a local level.  
In Colombia, there was no single ethnic identity under which to organize for a specific 
vision of post-conflict justice. A universal definition of “victim” is insufficient in the Colombia 
case. Reparations had multiple meanings. For many, land and the right to it was at the center of a 
meaningful transition and proved to be the primary focal point towards which multiple 
marginalized communities in the country could organize. While the Victims' Law acknowledged 
displacement as a core grievance of those impacted by the conflict, the state failed to recognize 
that the right to land is made up of more than legalized ownership; it must also recognize 
localized governance over the type and scope of development that is permitted to occur on land 
historically home to marginalized Colombians. The Victims’ Law was also incapable of 
rupturing the complex ties between corporations, paramilitary forces, criminal armed groups, and 
the state. The multiple actors involved in the conflict not only complicates who is a victim, and 
therefore who is entitled to compensation and to what type, but it also makes it more difficult to 
discern who victimized them. As a result of the state’s persistent failures and broad lack of 
presence in the regions most impacted by violence, grassroots groups have had to act outside of 
state-sanctioned means to articulate their demands, which require a different framework from 
that employed by the Colombian government.  
 
 20 
Bottom-up attempts to organize towards a unified goal  
Because various actors have suffered as a result of Colombia’s long-running conflict, it 
has been difficult to achieve a single victimized identity, and therefore victims of the conflict 
have faced organizational challenges in terms of officially airing their grievances. As a result, 
grassroots groups dedicated to specific causes have evolved, relying on non-institutional means 
to achieve specific goals. One example of this is “The Minga,” which is a word of Quechua 
origin describing the process of reciprocity (Murillo 2009). According to Murillo, the Minga 
implies resistance, encompassing multiple marginalized communities in their quest for political 
inclusion and engagement. The movement gained international attention in 2008 due to a mass 
mobilization of Colombia’s indigenous population. Since then, the movement has attracted new 
actors who have been systematically excluded from national-level political discussions. For one 
month in 2019, the Minga blocked a part of the Pan-American highway in Cauca in response to 
President Ivan Duque’s persistent refusal to engage with the country’s indigenous population 
(Laurent 2019). This year, when the Minga marched from Calí to Bogotá in an effort to again 
confront the President, Peace Commissioner Miguel Ceballos condemned the group’s reluctance 
to rely on traditional political institutions (Campo Palacios and Dest 2021).  
Efforts to retain rights to ancestral territory have been historically complicated and often 
met with violent resistance at the hands of various armed groups and the state. In 1991, twenty 
people, including four children, were killed by hooded gunmen who stormed a meeting held by 
indigenous people over land rights (Gomez Lizarazo 1992). Government-sponsored reports 
regarding the incident dismissed it as drug related; however, it was later reported that the 
gunmen had ties not only to landowners who feared collective action from the indigenous 
community, but also to the Colombian military (Murillo 2009, 141). The massacre makes the 
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complex ties between illegal armed groups and the military clear, and underscores the difficulty 
of identifying a specific antagonist in the conflict. It also demonstrates the extent to which land 
issues and associated restitution are central to the conflict, and how grassroots groups must act 
outside of institutional-political channels in their fight towards political inclusion.  
Initially, the Minga was organized around a unified indigenous identity, serving as a 
central space through which to engage around rights to the land and territory (Murillo 2009, 
140). Their primary goal was to combat “deterritorialization,” or the removal of indigenous 
groups to accommodate external actors, including land-owners or those with a corporate interest 
(141). The group soon evolved to include other communities and regions whose populations had 
been heavily affected by displacement or land seizure, such as the Afro-Colombian population 
on the Pacific Coast. Buenaventura, a major Colombian port city, has experienced endemic 
violence; criminal gangs fight to control the region’s illegal economies and associated transport, 
and many of them have proven associations with corporations with business interests in the 
region (Schmidt 2021). In 2008, thirty-five homes were burnt down on the same site an industrial 
project was scheduled to take place, and anonymous armed groups forcibly displaced countless 
others in the area when some refused to sell their homes to developers (Schmidt 2021).  
 What this section makes clear is the complex intersection of identities and causes in 
Colombia’s conflict. The Colombian government has been unsuccessful at opening meaningful 
paths towards political participation for those involved in, or impacted by, the conflict. Various 
attempts at peace, including the most recent 2016 Accords, have made it apparent that the state 
has not effectively addressed the diverse needs of a population with complex understandings of 
the conflict. Multiple perspectives on justice, amnesty, and peace underscore the need to envision 
transitions at the local level. In conflicts that fall along ethnic or religious lines, they are able to 
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create a post-conflict narrative that effectively defines a victimized identity. In Colombia’s case, 
however, no such clarity of narrative exists. As a result, disparate groups can only organize 
towards their most common goal: a radical vision of land use that is at odds with what the 




























Variable 2: The Role of Resources in the Colombian Conflict  
 
While the primary variable influencing bottom-up interpretations of transitional justice in 
Colombia is the multifaceted nature of the conflict, the country’s access to resources is another 
relevant variable that has impacted how grassroots actors frame transitional justice. The nation’s 
rich natural resources have proven to be both a source of conflict and a way to fund the war’s 
continuation. Resource extraction has proven to be one of the primary sources of contention 
between grassroots groups and the Colombian state and multinational corporations. Additionally, 
both guerrilla groups and paramilitaries funded their endeavors through the tax revenues from, 
and production of, coca crops. Without such a source of funding, it is unlikely the conflict would 
have been able to persist, and FARC’s reliance on the coca crop ultimately alienated them from 
their civilian base. Grassroots groups formed in opposition to territory-based conflict to enact 
their own vision of the land and its associated use.  
 
Natural resources: A blessing or a curse?  
 Colombia is a resource rich country. Its biodiversity contributes to a wide range of 
agricultural potential, and its nonrenewable resources include gold, other minerals, oil and gas, 
and others. To facilitate extraction, there have been high rates of displacement in resource 
abundant regions throughout the country. In regions with oil and gas reserves, the daily average 
number of displaced persons is around 1,029 (Hristov 2005). Resource rich regions remain the 
most violent, with the state taking an increasingly militarized stance against its residents. In 
Montes de Maria, an isolated region near the Caribbean coast, the state created what’s called a 
“Zone of Rehabilitation and Consolidation.” The region previously suffered from an absent state, 
and numerous massacres were carried out there. While increased security may appear necessary 
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given the region’s tumultuous history, the government is using its designation as a way to 
increase militarization and neoliberal development (Brody 2008).  
 Other regions throughout the country are facing similar issues in which competition over 
natural resources has led to violence and displacement. The bulk of recent atrocities in the 
country have occurred in regions undergoing extractivist development: In 2020, six people were 
killed in Tambo, a potential coal-mining site; There were two massacres in Nariño, a site 
dedicated to mining gold and other minerals; and the highest numbers of atrocities occurred in 
Antioquía, where there are various mining concessions (Power 2020). In regions where the 
FARC disarmed, smaller criminal gangs have attempted to take control over the resource rich 
territories (Rueda 2020).  
The resource curse, which in its origins was concerned with economic growth relative to 
resource abundance (Auty 1993), is not as applicable to Colombia as revisions of the theory, 
such as that stated by Collier and Heffler examining the relationship between resources and 
internal conflict (1998). Their theory states that access to natural resources increased a nation’s 
likelihood of internal conflict, contingent on a variety of economic causes. Sarkar and Sarkar 
(2017) expand upon the theory further by analyzing how access to resources influence insurgent 
relationships with civilians, using FARC as a case study. During the group’s early stages of 
development, they acquired little power, relying primarily on small-scale land development to 
gain limited amounts of capital. During the early 1980s, however, the FARC’s prospects changed 
as coca production and distribution boomed.  
 
Coca, the FARC, and damaged insurgent-civilian relations  
 Coca is perhaps the most influential resource in the Colombian conflict. Its illegality 
means it is not subject to regulation, and those who control the processing and distribution 
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centers can yield substantial profits. FARC’s relationship with coca production is complicated. 
Initially opposed to production of the crop because it was “a rapacious form of capitalism that 
was against the group’s Marxist doctrine” (Sarkar and Sarkar 2017, 884), they soon formed 
alliances with drug traffickers for a few reasons: First, FARC held military control over much of 
the coca producing region, allowing them easy access to funds derived from taxation. Second, 
opposing coca production meant losing settler support. Because the economic potential of coca 
production was so high, and because they could not compete with international producers 
growing traditional food crops, opposing coca would have meant losing part of the FARC’s 
existing support base (Sarkar and Sarkar 2017). According to LeGrand (2003), the FARC made 
between 200 to 500 million USD per year from taxation alone.  
After the FARC decided to engage with the cocaine trade, beginning in 1982, their 
military power multiplied, with the number of fronts increasing from 24 to 48 (Sarkar and Sarkar 
2017, 885). While the FARC initially organized around the defense of settler-land and peasant 
rights, control over elements of the cocaine trade allowed the group to redefine its goals. Not 
only did they expand their military presence, they made national-level power their objective 
(Sarkar and Sarkar 2017). Over the next several years, the FARC gradually evolved from a 
primarily political presence to a more militarized one, increasing their offensives against the 
Colombian armed forces and advancing their combat structures.  
While the FARC did rely on other sources of funding, it is unlikely that the group would 
have grown as militarily strong if they could not rely on the high taxations gained from the 
production and distribution of cocaine. Sarkar and Sarkar also note, however, that accumulation 
of military power left the FARC isolated from a civilian base, forcing them to neglect social 
projects at the expense of military ones. While they once relied on locals to offer supplies and 
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financing, money gained from cocaine rendered the need for local support nearly obsolete. 
Because they did not need local approval, meeting military economic demands grew to be the 
group’s top priority, and they were less reluctant to engage in practices such as kidnapping. As a 
result, popular support was further eroded.  
Paramilitary groups escalated their self-defense tactics in response to the increase in 
kidnappings, which further changed the nature of the conflict. Because kidnappings and extortion 
were often indiscriminate, people perceived it as “deeply unfair” and animosity towards the 
group increased even in regions in which they once experienced support (Kalyvas 2006, 153). At 
the same time, paramilitary groups terrorized the countryside, committing massacres and 
brutalizing civilians at alarming rates (Hristov 2005). Rural Colombians, often indigenous, 
occupy territories of enormous importance to the state, paramilitaries, and guerrilla groups. As a 
result, civilians inhabiting contested regions are often attacked by all three groups. According to 
data produced by Garcia Villegas and Espinosa (2015), a high density of coca crops corresponds 
with “very low” and “low” levels of state-supported justice-based institutions (10). Their data 
also demonstrates, unsurprisingly, that levels of displacement are highest in coca-producing 
regions. This means that the state is most absent in locations where there is the highest number of 
victims in need of state support.  
Although past peace treaties and the 2016 accords emphasized political inclusion for the 
FARC, civilians have little reason to rely on them to articulate their demands, particularly when 
they treated their land as a militarized commodity. Additionally, the FARC is hostile towards 
unions and other political organizations in the region, considering them political competition 
(Sarkar and Sarkar 2017). In areas in which the FARC has demilitarized, rather than an increased 
state presence in which vulnerable Colombians are protected, other criminal gangs and armed 
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groups have moved in to control the land. As a result, grassroots groups are left to redefine a 
vision of land use and ownership that is at odds with the country’s primary political forces.  
 
Bottom-up voices against extraction  
Various grassroots groups, particularly those in indigenous regions, have situated 
themselves as antagonistic not only to corporate extraction, but also to the FARC, the 
paramilitaries, and the Colombian state. Bottom-up voices have politically positioned themselves 
against all forms of economic and cultural subordination, which includes the FARC fronts 
(Sarkar and Sarkar 2017, 888). Despite aligning themselves with Colombian peasants and rural 
laborers during the early years of the conflict, the earnings gained from the production of coca 
alienated the FARC from their base and encouraged grassroots groups to form in opposition to 
them. The Quintin Lame Armed Movement, for example, was a guerrilla group created to 
promote indigenous land defense, partially against the FARC. They contributed to the 1991 
constitution in which indigenous rights to the land were at least partially recognized.  
The Regional Council of Cauca (Consejo Regional Indígena de Cauca, or CRIC) was 
established in 1971 to peacefully combat the state-sanctioned imposition of neoliberal 
extractivist policies in Colombia (Hristov 2005). The group formed because of decreasing access 
to cultivable land as a result of seizure by non-indigenous entities and has been persistently 
targeted by the state and other groups hostile to its mission. Since its formation, CRIC has relied 
primarily on land occupation as a tactic, centering access to ancestral land as essential to 
indigenous identity. Like the Minga, the group has indigenous origins but has expanded to 
accommodate a variety of ethnicities and identities who have been subject to displacement 
(Hristov 2005). Despite alliances with other cultural groups, however, the CRIC remains firmly 
place-based, focusing most of its efforts on the indigenous plight within Cauca.  
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According to Hristov, CRIC has successfully weakened the “pillars of political and 
ideological domination and institutionalized repression” (2005, 99). The group has successfully 
combated external influence to create a grassroots movement centering local autonomy and a 
vision of economic exchange that exists entirely outside of the state and other militarized forces 
in the region, such as the FARC and the paramilitaries. The CRIC’s creation of the resguardo, or 
legalized protection of collective lands, has allowed community members to control their own 
labor power and to establish economic organizations based on collective farms and stores (99).  
Currently, social movements in Colombia frequently revolve around land and resource 
extraction, with the relationships between paramilitaries, the guerrillas, and private interests 
frequently intersecting. Chiquita banana company, for example, was convicted of funding the 
AUC paramilitaries (INDEPAZ). Despite promises that the paramilitaries have disarmed, human 
rights organizations have identified persistent threats from paramilitary groups against human 
rights leaders in Colombia (Front Line Defenders). According to the Armed Conflict Locations 
& Event Data Project (ACLED), there were 600 recorded attacks against civilian social leaders 
or farmers on coveted land in 2020. The 2016 Peace Accords emphasized disarmament of the 
FARC while failing to consider the power vacuum that would result from their demobilization. 
Drug cartels and other armed groups are now violently fighting for control over Colombia’s most 
resource-rich regions. The government’s inability to adequately consider how land and resources 
have shaped and will continue to shape the conflict has forced grassroots groups to be the sole 
advocates for their communities. Because their goals are often at odds with the state and its 
development goals, they act without protection.  
The FARC initially emphasized peasant rights and autonomy and fought for their 
political representation. However, as they were better able to fund their military expansion using 
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profits from coca production, their social projects faltered, and civilian-insurgent relations grew 
strained. At the same time, Colombia’s abundant natural resources have created a continuous 
battle for land, with the Colombian state considering “commercial rural development” a 
precondition for peace (Montoya Londoño and Vallejo Mejia 2016). Communities in resource 
rich regions are frequent victims of displacement, and in state-abandoned territories the FARC 
once controlled, criminal gangs have attempted to take control of the region. Because of the 
central role resources have played in Colombia’s conflict, bottom-up voices have struggled to 
retain or regain control of their land, with autonomy and territorial control a central part of their 

























Variable 3: Catholic Liberation Theology and Radical Interpretations of Peace 
 
Catholic liberation theology was most prominent in Latin America in the 1970s and 
1980s, with many considering it to be currently obsolete. As Celis and Furio (2016) observe, 
however, liberation theology continues to influence Colombian social movements, even if 
components of the ideology have slightly shifted. Adherents of radical Catholicism consider 
imperialism and capitalism to be responsible for the violence and inequality in the so-called 
“underdeveloped” region. As a result, grassroots groups with a radical, faith-based understanding 
of justice frequently pursue an approach to peace that is antagonistic to that put forward by the 
state and other economic interests. Land is at the center of liberation theology in Colombia, with 
defenders of territorial rights frequently invoking religious themes and imagery, and receiving 
the support of religious leaders in the community.  
 
Liberation Theology and its history in Colombia 
 As a result of the Second Vatican Council, followed by the Second Episcopal Conference 
of Latin America in Medellín, the Catholic church and its leaders reassessed and discussed its 
role in society and its responsibility towards the economic and political crises of the era. 
Liberation theology emerged partially from such discussions, and partially in response to post-
WWII developmentalist policies in which wealthy countries such as the US imposed progress 
towards an industrialized economy (Celis and Furio 2016). Before the advent of liberation 
theology, there was widespread discussion among the wealthy Christian class about its 
responsibility towards the poor. They lamented the technological and economic divide between 
the global north and south, while failing to account for the intentionality behind the existing 
economic system. Their response was bent on “modernization” and was widely criticized as 
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“analogous to the civilizing mission imposed on Latin America since European colonization” 
(Celis and Furio 2016, 71).  
Rather than rely on monetary assistance from the wealthy North, countries in Latin 
America began to adopt a liberatory stance, choosing instead to fight for social justice struggles. 
They criticized the entire global economic system that allowed some countries to be the 
providers of aid and others to be the recipients while maintaining existing structures of 
dominance (Celis and Furio 2016). Rather than progressing towards the end goal of 
development, adherents of liberation theology questioned the idea of development itself. They 
did not believe in progressing along a path towards economic prosperity and peace as 
hegemonically defined, but rather liberating themselves from intentionally created oppressive 
structures in which “peripheral” nations provide materials and labor for those at the economic 
center. Rather than peace, liberation theologists and its adherents called for armed struggle (Celis 
and Furio 2016).  
 In Colombia, several groups dedicated to anti-capitalist Catholicism formed. The 
Golconda, for example, was a group of Catholic priests dedicated to combating foreign power 
and dependency, often through military means. Many of the member priests ultimately joined 
Marxist guerrilla forces, and as a result the group was rapidly disbanded. Those suspected of 
Golconda membership were tortured, killed, disappeared, and stripped of their power and titles 
(Celis and Furio 2016, 74). It’s important to note that Catholic leadership did not unanimously 
support liberation theology, and that the church’s internal structures mimicked those of the 
broader world. Powerful priests from wealthy countries largely condemned liberation theology or 
retained ambiguity in their responses to it (Celis and Furio 2016, 76); in Colombia and in other 
parts of Latin America where humanitarian crises took on an everyday urgency, the defense of 
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human rights became an essential element of survival. Church leaders in marginalized regions of 
Latin America who led congregations full of brutalized people inevitably acted in solidarity with 
them, and saw in their suffering a connection to biblical texts and imagery. They, like their 
followers, saw in themselves the crucified Christ.  
 Liberation theology in Colombia rapidly expanded throughout the 1980s, as base 
communities and theological-social educational initiatives centered the defense of human rights 
and its associated political mobilization (Celis and Furio 2016). Catholic Churches which 
adhered to liberation theology organized victims of the war’s many atrocities, channeling their 
outrage into concentrated martyrdom. Rather than fear the state’s oppression, liberation theology 
encouraged them to fight towards a broader vision of justice. In 1989, for example, the ELN had 
a large political presence in many sites of land struggle. Rather than rapidly expanding their 
military control, the ELN instead exerted ideological and social control, garnering enough power 
to pressure landlords to migrate away from their large land tracts (Berman-Arévalo 2019).   
The ELN was largely motivated by liberation theology, in part due to the influence of the 
priest and theologian Camilo Torres. The group emphasized “living with dignity” and was 
known for possessing a specifically “moral” character, as exemplified by the fact that the ELN 
(unlike the FARC) refused to fund their projects with the drug trade (Gruber and Pospisil 2015). 
It was with a “messianic” approach that they fought the landowning elites, advocating for 
peasant rights to the land and an eradication of capitalism and imperialism. It was this same 
sense of solid moral identity that encouraged the ELN to view alternative political ideologies as a 
monolithic enemy. The US, the Colombian state, and the landowning elites are all on the side of 
evil, and negotiations towards a state-sanctioned peace would not, in the eyes of the ELN, be a 
peace at all.  
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Contemporary manifestations of Liberation Theology in Colombia 
The ELN’s ideological reliance on radical Catholicism may help to explain why peace 
talks with that guerrilla group have persistently failed, and why many communities who once 
relied on their support share a similarly radical approach to contemporary extractivism.  Current 
adherents, or the “heirs of liberation theology” (Celis and Furio 2016, 79), attribute human rights 
violations to capitalist development, largely because the violations against which they are trying 
to defend are the result of the state’s perceived need to impose a specific economic model. For 
many Colombians living in extraction zones, such development entails not only the 
disappearance from the land via displacement, but through “radical breaks with their 
environment and way of life” (Celis and Furio 2016, 79). In the early 2000s, for example, the 
Colombian government created economic development plans designating palm oil as an 
alternative crop to coca, allocating financial and military resources to producers and growers of 
palm oil. Using the theology of liberation and human rights, residents within the palm oil 
producing regions of Jiguamiandó and Curvaradó created an alternative vision of development 
and transition, combating the state’s narrative of how the production of palm oil could help 
produce peace (Celis and Furio 2016).  
The Colombian state favors the production of palm oil and other similar crops because, 
due to its myriad potential uses, it is considered stable and therefore valuable to investors 
(Sankey 2016). As part of President Santos’ development plan, the expansion of agricultural 
products such as palm oil was one of the five necessary components for economic growth and 
post-conflict stability. While rural development projects were predicted to decrease  rural 
violence, it has led to further land appropriation of peasants and neglects a place-based 
understanding of peace. Peasants in agro-extractavist regions in Colombia have relied on various 
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organization strategies to combat the state-sanctioned narrative of development, including 
continued land occupations and resistance. Their strategies are often supported by the Catholic 
Church in their respective communities.  
In Chocó, on the Colombian Pacific Coast, for example, radical Catholic bishops helped 
form religion-ethnic organizations specifically supporting the Afro-Colombian population. 
According to Ríos Oyola’s examination of church practices in Chocó, territory was an essential 
element to identity, and extractivism a direct threat to it (2017). Religious leaders in the region 
have attempted to facilitate dialogue between Pacifica coastal communities and armed actors or 
state institutions. While the ELN was driven to armed action as a result of liberation theology, it 
has multiple manifestations as evidenced by a number of the religious groups in the Pacific Coast 
region; they want autonomy over their land but do not want to rely on armed conflict. Instead, 
they have created “humanitarian zones” in which civilian populations are exclusively entitled to 
certain segments of land. With the support of organizations such as the Inter-Church Justice and 
Peace Commission, they organize towards protecting their civilian humanitarian zones from 
armed displacement and economic development projects (Celis and Furio 2016, 80).  
 While the state framed the narrative of displacement as a direct result of the ongoing 
armed conflict, residents instead put forth a narrative in which the displacement was sponsored 
by the state to make space for powerful economic interests (Celis and Furio 2016, 80). Catholic 
liberation theology still plays a role in the philosophy of Colombia’s grassroots actors, 
encouraging autonomy through anti-imperialism and redistribution. While liberation theology is 
not entirely monolithic, with some adherents advocating armed struggles and others more 
peaceful forms of resistance, they share an emphasis on the economic and developmentalist 
nature of violence and displacement: For Colombia’s indigenous and Afro-descendant 
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populations, capitalist development implies violence, a rupture from their environment, history, 
and way of life (79). As a result, grassroots groups in many parts of rural Colombia have 
explicitly rejected the narrative of post-conflict transition as imposed by the state and powerful 

















Guatemala: neoliberalism at the grassroots  
Background on the Conflict: A 36 Year Genocide  
 Between 1944 and 1954 in Guatemala, the “Democratic Revolution” promised to 
radically improve the lives of indigenous Guatemalans. Previously, they had been forced to face 
unfair laws in which they had to labor for nearly non-existent wages on plantations or 
infrastructure projects throughout the country (Copeland 2011). They faced rampant violence 
and dispossession. Beginning in 1944, however, the country began to change. Land and labor 
reforms resulted in the potential for radical redistribution and the possibility for workers to 
unionize for improved conditions and better wages. In 1954, hope for reforms ended when the 
CIA overthrew Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, plunging Guatemala into a period of military control 
and brutal authoritarianism. During this time, several guerrilla groups formed, engaging in 
“consciousness raising” and organizing towards land reform, ultimately hoping for true 
democratic participation through armed struggle (Copeland 2011). They recruited indigenous 
Guatemalans into their ranks, and in the 1970s a Maya movement began gaining momentum. 
The groups emphasized political education, organizing in small, “semi-clandestine 
organizations” (Vogt 2015, 33).  
The conflict reached its peak intensity in the 1980s when the Generals Lucas García and 
Efrain Ríos Montt embarked on a brutal “scorched earth” campaign against the guerrilla soldiers 
and the country’s ethnic Maya (Hatcher 2009). They believed the indigenous population to be 
“natural allies'' to the guerrillas, and the military therefore targeted them based on their racial and 
ethnic identity (McDonnell 2018). The military and associated Civil Self-defense Patrols (PACs) 
carried out massacres of shocking brutality throughout the countryside in an attempt to destroy 
“the social base of the guerrillas'' (McDonnell 2018). The Guatemalan government considered 
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the indigenous residents to be insufficiently patriotic and poorly “integrated into state structures” 
(Hatcher 2009, 141), and therefore more amenable to radicalization. In their attempt to “drain the 
sea to kill the fish” (Briggs 2013), they destroyed entire villages and terrorized civilians through 
a variety of means, including forced disappearances, rampant sexual violence, and massacres 
targeting all age groups (Hatcher 2009). Those who were spared were forced into “model 
villages'' in which the army held complete control over the indigenous people who resided there. 
The military used the villages as an attempt to demonstrate heroism, materially providing for 
those they had already displaced. They attempted to control the narrative of war by portraying 
the guerrillas as entirely responsible for the violence in the country.  
While the counterinsurgency failed to ever fully defeat the guerrillas, Guatemala’s civil 
war came to an official end in 1996 when the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad 
Revolucionario Nacional Guatemalteca, URNG), an umbrella group of guerrilla forces, signed a 
peace accord with the Guatemalan government. While other guerrilla groups successfully 
transitioned into political parties after a negotiated end to conflict, such as the FMLN in El 
Salvador, the URNG failed to ever successfully do so (Allison 2016). In part, this may be 
attributed to their lack of military and political cohesion. Towards the end of the Civil War, those 
URNG members who were not killed fled into exile or chose to defect from the guerrilla army 
(Allison 2016). During the UN-sponsored demobilization process, it was discovered that the 
number of guerrillas had been overestimated and that there were only about 1,000 to 1,500 
combatants (Allison 2016, 1049). The URNG had minimal political knowledge or experience. 
Many of the combatants who joined the guerrillas during the later years did so because they 
wanted to enact revenge on Guatemalan military members, not because they adhered to the 
URNG’s political ideologies.  
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While defined as an internal war, the majority of the 250,000 lives lost were Maya 
(Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza 144:2008). While they make up the ethnic majority in the country, 
they were considered a “racial underclass” (Copeland 2011), and therefore the war had a 
distinctly genocidal characteristic to it. As part of the peace accords, the URNG and the 
Guatemalan government agreed to a mutual attempt to understand and relate the history of the 
armed conflict. As a result, the Commission for the Clarification of History (CEH) was formed 
(Hatcher 2009), followed by the Recuperation of Historical Memory Project (REMHI). Each 
group produced documents detailing the Civil War’s history.  
The memory groups and ensuing documents were created in an attempt to recognize the 
human rights violations which occurred during the country’s conflict, and also to strengthen 
democracy and prevent future instances of mass violence (Hatcher 2009). According to the truth 
commissions, the Guatemalan military was responsible for over 90% of the deaths that took 
place during the course of the war (McDonnell 2018). Despite such statistics, the documents 
largely emphasized amnesty, failing to attribute responsibility to any individual and leaving the 
generals who oversaw brutal civilian massacres to live with impunity. As a result of the 
documents’ limitations, the Catholic Church created the Recuperation of Historical Memory 
(Récupération de la Memoria Histórica, REMHI) project, from which they produced the Nunca 
Más report consisting of over 6,500 interviews conducted largely in Guatemala’s indigenous 
languages (Hatcher 2009).  
While the Nunca Más report was expansive and complimented the work of the other two 
memory groups, it too facilitated a process of “forgetting,” emphasizing forgiveness and 
reconciliation. It was not until 2013 when General Ríos Montt was finally convicted of 
genocide. Initially, the conviction was hailed as a landmark case. It was the first time a head of 
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state had ever faced a formal genocide charge in his own country (McDonnell 2018). Only two 
weeks later, however, the genocide conviction was overturned. “Forgetting” remains a 
cornerstone of the Guatemalan conflict and shapes the way grassroots actors have attempted to 




























Variable 1: The Genocidal Nature of the Guatemalan Conflict 
Due to Guatemala’s scorched earth policy clearly aimed at the nation’s ethnic Maya, 
Guatemala grassroots groups had a specific framework in which to operate; they emphasized 
ethnic political inclusion and recognition, which ultimately superseded other demands within the 
conflict, such as land and class-based reforms or accountability for war crimes. Unlike 
Colombia, in which varying competing narratives make it difficult for the conflict to be easily 
defined, Guatemala’s conflict was largely one in which the military and associated PACs carried 
out crimes against civilians in an effort to defeat and demoralize the supposed social base of the 
guerrillas. Maya were the clear victims of the conflict and, as a result, a “bottom-up” 
interpretation of peace took the form of the recognition of indigenous Guatemalans as politically 
active agents who are entitled to institutional inclusion. However, due to the war’s brutality and 
targeted nature, inclusion was made complicated and fear-ridden, and grassroots actors 
ultimately fought for a state-sanctioned neoliberal peace. The Guatemala case fits into what Hale 
calls “neoliberal multiculturalism,” which is characterized by symbolic inclusion and 
endorsement, but with firm opposition to substantive transformation (2004 as cited in Vogt 
2015).  
 
Heterogeneity and a Disarticulated Movement  
 The conflict initially opened up opportunity structures for Maya mobilization, and 
various indigenous coalitions formed during the 1990s, greatly influencing the peace process 
(Vogt 2015). According to Edelman (2005), the cessation of civil conflict and move towards 
greater democratization allowed previously excluded actors political inclusion. Because of their 
“arduous struggle” in Guatemala’s conflict and post-conflict processes, Maya felt empowered to 
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claim participatory space (30). While at first, it appeared as though they were gaining political 
ground, the Maya movements quickly stagnated, stunting indigenous rights within the country.  
 There are a few reasons why the indigenous political movement in Guatemala lost 
momentum. One primary theory, according to Vogt (2015), is that heterogeneous groups have a 
more difficult time mobilizing. While the peace process emphasized Maya inclusion, it failed to 
account for the various linguistic and cultural groups within the country. While in some countries 
disparate indigenous groups are able to make radical demands of the state (Bolivia, for example), 
in Guatemala they have largely failed to do so. During the peace process in Guatemala, 
grassroots indigenous groups participated in the reconstruction of the country, and they had 
access to institutional political space. The power was distributed in a sectoral way, however, 
allocating different topics to different commissions. This sectoralization, according to Vogt, 
ultimately divided the Maya and discouraged them from forming cohesive indigenous demands. 
It was a “divide and rule” strategy (41). Without state support and before the brutality of the 
1980s, grassroots groups did articulate radical visions of indigenous territorial control. It was 
when the state began to include (but control) the indigenous narrative that their demands grew 
less radical.  
 
State Violence and Post-Conflict Indigenous Identity 
  The heterogeneity of Guatemala’s indigenous groups is only a small factor in the 
disarticulated Maya movement. More vital factors are the state’s influence on ethnic identity and 
its horrific history of violence. It is important to mention the persistent political exclusion and 
institutional violence that has historically plagued the Maya. A lack of economic and social 
resources has made political mobilization materially challenging. During the Liberal Revolution, 
beginning in 1871, powerful ladinos (non-indigenous Guatemalans) began to build a nation 
 42 
characterized by sharp racial divides and inequality (Vogt 2015), divisions that contributed to the 
civil war and ensuing ethnic violence. The guerrillas initially received the support of indigenous 
civilians, and their presence initially spurred feelings of political agency and belief in the 
transformative power of collective action (Copeland 2011). Despite the early optimism of radical 
politics, attempts towards radical reforms were brutally suppressed. It wasn’t until the peace 
accords were signed and the nation had to contend with its ethnically motivated violence and 
associated international condemnation that the Maya could participate openly in institutional 
politics (Vogt 2015). A major success of the peace accords was that they formally acknowledged 
Guatemala as a “multiethnic and multilingual state” (34). Although indigenous ethnicity was 
formally recognized, it was also influenced by the state.  
 According to Vogt, the state has persistently employed rhetoric in which they distinguish 
between who is a “good” Maya and who is “bad,” and have also made claims towards defining 
who can be considered “authentically” indigenous (2015, 40). Typically, the Maya are defined as 
“bad” when they question the fundamental basis of Guatemala’s government or raise doubts 
about state legitimacy. When relying on extra-institutional means to enact power, they are 
quickly labeled “radicals,” “anarchists,” or “terrorists” (41). While such rhetoric may be typical 
of many governments, in Guatemala, given the history of state-sanctioned violence and 
associated fear, the implications are graver. Also as a result of the country’s history of targeted 
violence, Guatemalan Maya are often likely to distance themselves from the left, which is 
typically a natural alliance for indigenous rights groups (Vogt 2015). “Good” Maya, on the other 
hand, make their demands compatible with state-led neoliberal reforms and primarily rely on 
non-confrontational tactics to make their demands.  
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 Due to the trajectory of the conflict, indigenous Guatemalans’ “strategic assumptions of 
identity, including forced complicity with repression, were crucial to war-time and post-war 
survival” (Copeland 2011, 490). During the scorched earth policies of the 1980s, the Maya grew 
to fear the brutality of the state and to learn that radical ideologies would be met with oppression. 
The conflict shaped indigenous identity in ways other than deep-seeded fear, however. The army 
often forced indigenous Guatemalans to fight the war against the guerrillas, making them 
abandon their language and heritage in the process. In addition to counterinsurgency operations, 
their forced recruitment was also a form of coerced assimilation. The soldiers were creating a 
“new Guatemala,” which was meant to be free not only of leftist radical thought but of 
indigenous Mayan practices as well (Hatcher 2009). The military intentionally created a state-
sanctioned Maya group they would later use to leverage against those who believed in radical 
redistribution as a fundamental indigenous right.  
 After the army began to shift its tactics, relying less on its “scorched earth policy” and 
more on community development in order to bolster support, they united indigenous villagers 
under the common goal of political inclusion. As the army realized it could not win a war 
without a support base, they began building a future in which some Maya were “state-
sanctioned,” or, in other words, “anti-guerrilla, pro-army, and nationalist” (Copeland 2011). 
They supported some local level indigenous political initiatives in which Maya leaders sought 
representation, and united the community under development-oriented projects. In the late 1980s, 
the National Advancement Party (Partido de Avanzada Nacional, or PAN), a conservative party 
made up primarily of the oligarchy, provided funds and electoral support to indigenous leaders. 
Their support was, of course, conditional on their disavowal of radical reforms and associated 
groups (Copeland 2011).  
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 The above-mentioned political context may help explain why indigenous Guatemalans 
support surprising initiatives, such as their widespread support for the conservative Guatemalan 
Republican Front (Frente Republicano Guatemalteco, or the FRG). Their support was made 
more shocking given that Efrain Ríos Montt, the general responsible for carrying out and 
ordering genocide throughout the Guatemalan highlands, was the party’s presidential candidate. 
As part of his campaign, Ríos Montt promised to compensate ex-PACs with US$640 each. 
Although the PACs were responsible for much of the civil war-era brutality, the initiative 
received widespread indigenous support. In his 2011 study on indigenous advocacy for the FRG, 
Copeland concludes that while many Maya held a desire to see radical reforms, they were 
dissuaded from articulating them due to continued fear of state violence and lingering pessimism 
about the state’s ability to make change. In addition, the FRG candidates promised development 
projects to towns in which they received the most votes. As a result, indigenous Guatemalans 
were deterred by a government they believed to be inevitably oppressive and encouraged by 
politicians’ promises for personal gain. Even those Maya who did articulate revolutionary and 
anti-extractivist ideas felt “collectively defeated” and “powerless” (2011, 504).  
 Ultimately, the recognition of Guatemalan Maya identity was an essential element of the 
peace accords. Massive inequality between ladinos and indigenous Guatemalans, and a history of 
ethnically driven violence, led to the 36 year period of conflict in the country. The political 
recognition of Guatemalan indigenous identity was strategic, however, both for the state and for 
the persistently brutalized Maya. Conditional recognition and inclusion of indigenous leaders in 
the political sphere created a context in which political rights were granted only to “good” Maya 
who were friendly to the state’s terms and neoliberal reforms. The Maya also shaped their 
identity and politics strategically. As a result of the war’s evolution from periods of extreme 
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ethnically-targeted violence to an eventual emphasis on development, many Maya began to 
associate personal prosperity and security with neoliberal development. Grassroots groups 
formed alongside these goals.  
 In addition, the sheer brutality of the war and its targeted nature influenced the way 
indigenous Guatemalans respond to the state. Those who survived their massacres were silenced 
by fear, and many witnesses to the military’s crimes were killed themselves. The war created a 
cycle by which the state was seen as immovable and inevitably repressive. Rather than working 
to reform the government, the Guatemalans have so little faith in the government and its capacity 
to change that they don’t put any faith in its possible reformation (Carey 2004, 79). Guatemalans 
who attempt to articulate political demands outside of institutional channels are still met with 
brutality. In 2005, for example, protestors fighting against free-trade agreements were shot by the 
national police (Copeland 2005, 505). While there have been repeated protests in the country 
over the course of the last decade, they are typically to speak out against crime and corruption, 
with radical demands involving the country’s widespread inequality and indigenous rights far 
less frequent. The pervasive memory of state violence has created a culture of fear for grassroots 












Variable 2: Resources and NGO Reliance 
 Grassroots groups in Guatemala did not have a strong resource base on which to rely. 
Given persistent poverty in indigenous Guatemalan communities, the grassroots groups that 
formed after the conflict relied on international funding to articulate their demands. The civil war 
gained international attention and, as a result, international NGOs were drawn to the region. 
While their funding was necessary given the lack of resources local communities held, it 
ultimately depoliticized certain causes and forced grassroots groups to compete for much-needed 
donor funding. Rather than creating a unified voice for indigenous struggle in Guatemala, they 
adopted a donor-driven approach and altered strategies and demands based on what would result 
in an influx of funds. As a result, bottom-up voices have formulated goals that are amenable to 
neoliberal policies, and popular modes of mobilization are infrequent.  
 
The Transnational Advocacy Network  
 After the war, Guatemalans relied heavily on international NGO support to “place their 
complaints, obtain capacity-building training, and receive support in their lobbying to the state” 
(Vogt 2015, 36), relying on what Keck and Sikkink (1998) refer to as the “transnational 
advocacy network.” The transnational advocacy networks “link activists in developed countries 
with others in or from less developed countries” (69), which was largely the case in Guatemala. 
According to Copeland (2011), roughly three-fourths of Guatemalan grassroots groups relied on 
international support. There are a few different reasons why this is the case. First, Guatemala 
suffers from widespread poverty and inequality, which is particularly persistent for indigenous 
groups (The World Bank in Guatemala). Second, there was widespread mistrust amongst 
Guatemalans towards the justice system, forcing them to rely on external means of achieving 
their goals. And third, the increase in NGO attention to the region following the conflict allowed 
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for increased donor activity, allowing a number of foreign and local NGOs to partner and 
flourish during the years following the conflict (Edelman 2005).  
 Destrooper and Parmentier (2008) offer a favorable view towards NGO influence on the 
transitional justice process in Guatemala. They conclude that the transitional justice process 
supported indigenous grassroots efforts by offering them access to elite allies, while still 
allowing them the opportunity to form their own goals, agenda, and justice-based processes 
(2018, 323). NGO influence was especially favorable in the case of Guatemalan indigenous 
women’s groups, in which, according to the authors, “transitional justice from below” was 
permitted to take place with the support of external resources (324). The civil war and post-
conflict processes ultimately altered the opportunity structures for indigenous women’s groups in 
the country, creating a “dynamic and complex civil society” (328). In fact, a number of 
indigenous women’s groups did evolve during the transitional justice process, emphasizing their 
political inclusion and specific experiences with conflict.  
 The Actoras de Cambio (actors for change) was a partnership among several regional 
indigenous women’s groups that emphasized specific, place-based experiences of conflict and 
local ideas of justice. They engaged in memory work through various exercises, hoping to use 
memory and its associated healing processes as a mode of community recovery (Destrooper and 
Parmentier 2018). The Grupos de Mujeres de Kaqla (The Kaqla Women’s Group) is another 
organization with similar goals and processes. They focused on how recovery could better cater 
to indigenous women, using indigenous practices to form a rights-based discourse. Both the 
Actoras de Cambio and the Mujeres Maya de Kaqla were, as a result, able to integrate locally-
based truth-telling and healing practices with the national and international agenda of “justice 
and women’s rights'’ (Desstropper and Parmentier 2018, 335).  
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Despite their emphasis on place-based notions of justice, however, neither of the groups 
strived for truly transformative changes in rights and distribution (Desstropper and Parmentier 
2018). During the post-conflict period, many international NGOs focused on funding groups that 
emphasized societal healing through psychosocial well-being and experience-based approaches 
(336). While micro understandings of experience and justice are important towards individual 
and community healing after conflict, they are at risk, Desstropper and Parmentier admit, of 
depoliticization (338). They also fail to account for the root causes of the conflict. Such a 
statement is not meant to delegitimize the valuable and important work healing-based groups 
engage in with their respective communities, but rather to begin the discussion on how place-
based movements can be deradicalized by reliance on NGO funds.  
 
“NGO-ization” and the battle for funding  
 In the 1990s, there was considerable scholarly discussion surrounding the role of NGOs 
and their impacts on social movements. From this conversation came the word “NGO-ization,” 
coined by Sonia Alvarez in 1998 (as discussed in Alvarez 2009), which reflected how NGOs 
depoliticized grassroots groups and oriented their goals towards neoliberal ones. This is 
frequently the case with Guatemala. While the transnational advocacy network may allow groups 
access to elite allies, strategies, and funding, it may not always lead to radically improved 
circumstances for victims of conflict. Much of the funding Guatemalan grassroots groups 
received was contingent upon specific activities and goals as defined by the donors (Vogt 2015), 
which problematized local autonomy in a number of ways. Grassroots goals and needs grew to 
reflect those which would garner increased funding and attention, forcing popular organizations 
to undergo NGO-ization.  
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 Edelman (2005) examines the impact of NGO funds in his examination of the association 
of Central American Peasant Organizations for Cooperation and Development (Asociación de 
Organizaciones Campesinas de Centroamérica para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo, or 
ASOCODE). The organization quickly rose to prominence among Central American NGOs, 
eventually gaining enough funding that it was in excess of the needs of its projects (33). As a 
result, success in fundraising began to be conflated with political success, even if little change or 
local impact had been made. The organization, which was meant to serve various smaller 
organizations in the region, soon grew to be structurally top-down. It changed its needs based on 
donor demand rather than on what local communities required. While ASOCODE aligned itself 
with popular organizations and did not define itself as an NGO, it quickly began to resemble one. 
Relying on a series of popular buzzwords such as “sustainability” and “accountability,” the 
organization soon began to spend its funding on unnecessary excesses, such as weekend trips to 
Costa Rica (Edelman 2005, 34). Those local organizations that relied on ASOCODE were forced 
to tailor their goals towards what their foreign donors required. “Activism” was defined in terms 
of “seminars, workshops, and congresses, each with its corresponding declaration, poster, and 
funding report” (39).  
 Because indigenous grassroots groups in Guatemala relied on external funding, they often 
competed with one another for much-needed donations, diluting what could have been a 
cohesive set of demands (Vogt 2015). External project funding “hobbled the re-emergence of 
viable social movements in Guatemala” (Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza 2008, 166) and prevented 
groups from striving for radical change. According to Vogt (2015), donor agencies typically 
prefer to fund NGOs that are well-organized around a single topic, rather than on groups 
pursuing broad social change (36), and the funding is also tied to the execution of specific 
 50 
activities. While the resources from international donors have helped Guatemalan Maya 
articulate their political claims, it has also encouraged them to make specific types of claims, 
many of which were condoned by donors with neoliberal leanings.  
The Guatemala case illustrates why the transnational advocacy network can prove 
fruitful, but it also demonstrates its cracks. Guatemalan indigenous groups had few resources of 
their own on which to rely, particularly given the destruction caused by the civil war and 
centuries of political marginalization. Access to elite allies and international courts are often 
necessary, particularly when a national government may be unable or unwilling to address its 
own injustices. In Guatemala, however, international influence depoliticized local movements 
and forced them into a neoliberal framework in which substantive change was never fully 
articulated or realized. The Guatemala case proves how access to resources (or lack thereof) can 
















Variable 3: Neo-Pentecostal Influence   
The third variable that has influenced how grassroots actors articulate their vision of 
transitional justice is religion. While Colombia was largely influenced by liberation theology and 
its associated radical teachings, Neo-Pentecostalism has gained momentum in Guatemala, 
discouraging radical change and collective action. The evangelical movements encourage close 
adherence to conservative politics and Christian-cultural dominion, as well as an individual over 
communal approach to peace and a “forgiveness”-centric vision of amnesty. Evangelical 
missionaries have also villainized an explicitly Maya identity, condemning traditional practices 
as “evil” and discouraging radical reforms which would explicitly benefit them (Reu 2019). Neo-
Pentecostal churches are frequently the grassroots actors in the region, organizing their 
congregations around issues pertaining to the individual. While evangelical church leaders and 
their followers may not consider themselves “grassroots groups,” there’s no doubt that they are 
the voices influencing politics in the region.  
 
The Rise of Evangelical Neo-Pentecostalism in Guatemala 
 The Neo-Pentecostal movement began to spread throughout Guatemala during the 
conflict. In his attempt to “sanitize” indigenous community members from communism, General 
Ríos Montt requested that Neo-Pentecostal missionaries from the US arrive to the newly-created 
“model villages” to “spiritually” and physically nourish the residents (Philpot-Munson 2009, 44). 
As a result, residents began to associate the arrival of necessary aid (such as food) with the Neo-
Pentecostalists. As a result, those sites most damaged by the civil war were also the sites of 
concurrent Pentecostal conversion, and the rates of conversion were highest during the most 
brutal periods of the war (Philpot-Munson 2009, 46). Among Latin American countries, 
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Guatemala has the highest number of non-Catholic congregants, with recent data indicating that 
forty-three percent identify as evangelical (2019 Report on International Religious Freedom). 
While, based on the above data, the dominant religion in the country is still Catholic, the 
influence Neo-Pentecostalism has had in indigenous communities specifically, and therefore on 
bottom-up indigenous voices, is the primary focus of this section. Catholic liberation theology 
was a major influence in the country in the 1970s, with sympathy towards guerrilla groups and 
armed struggle in the name of the poor (Copeland 2011). Evangelicals, on the other hand, 
broadly denounced the guerrillas and the revolution more broadly. Catholicism and its adherents 
were targeted as potential radicals, which may partially explain the high rates of conversion 
during the worst years of the war; immersing oneself in evangelical communities was seen as a 
form of protection. It was safer than Catholicism.  
There were other reasons for the appeal of protestantism in Guatemalan communities. 
According to Weber (1930 as cited in Reu 2019), the protestant ethic views salvation through 
individual responsibility, self-discipline, and business and personal success. As a result, personal 
growth and prosperity was associated with the protestant ethic. In other words, while radical 
Catholic churches emphasized liberation from oppressive economic forces, the Neo-Pentecostals 
claimed that changes to individual behavior could allow one to benefit from the market 
economy. It’s unsurprising that some indigenous groups, who suffered from persistently high 
levels of poverty followed by decades of brutality, gravitated towards such teachings. If 
indigenous groups found the state to be immovable and oppressive, then it becomes clear why 
many would be drawn to a doctrine emphasizing self-growth. It is far easier to control.  
According to Gooren (2002), Neo-Pentecostal adherents rarely joined social movements 
(38). However, while congregants did not consider themselves to be part of a social movement as 
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it is typically understood, there is no doubt that that is precisely what religion is. Leaders 
organized their congregants around a specific set of goals and values. Attending church not only 
allowed for spiritual reflection and learning, it was a way to network and to “cultivate new skills 
and responsibilities” (Gooren 2002). After the economic crisis in the country during the 1980s, 
many Guatemalans were forced to rely on the informal economy. The Neo-Pentecostal church 
gave them the tools and moral framework in which to turn their work into a “small-scale 
enterprise” (Gooren 2002, 39). The church community was, above all, a grassroots group 
advocating for personal and spiritual betterment.  
Evangelical beliefs have impacted the peace process in many ways. Namely, they have 
advocated for increased military presence and are critical of the peace accords as a whole. They 
believe the proliferation of indigenous rights will “bring the wrath of God” (Philpot-Munson 
2009, 46). Former President Jorge Serrano Elías and Harold Caballeros, a pastor and politician, 
formed the Vision with Values (Visión con Valores, or VIVA) party, which “pits an implicitly 
Mayan idolatrous past against the prosperity that evangelical conversion supposedly brings to 
individuals and the nation” (Reu 2019, 758). Neo-Pentecostal adherents have prevented the 
pursuit of justice for war crimes, and have even tried to stop the exhumation of mass graves 
(Philpot-Munson 2009, 46). The evangelical church has also radically impacted the ways 
indigenous groups respond to possible reforms, such as the 1999 Referendum.   
 
The 1999 Referendum and the Evangelical Influence  
The 1999 Referendum, which was born from the recognition of Guatemala as a 
multiethnic state, was created to guarantee further rights and ethnic equality for the Maya (Carey 
2004). The referendum sought to address the most neglected aspects of the peace accords, 
including reducing the size of the armed forces, demobilization of the PACs, and the addressal of 
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socioeconomic inequality (71). Despite the early promises of the peace accords, indigenous 
Guatemalans remained politically marginalized and with far less access to resources than their 
ladino counterparts. The 1999 Referendum was meant to address such failures. If successful, it 
would permit Congress to pass legislation implementing the remaining elements of the peace 
accord. The majority of Guatemalan citizens voted “no” on its implementation.  
There were a number of articles in the referendum explicitly revolving around indigenous 
rights and recognition in the country, namely the official recognition of 25 languages, access to 
sacred sites and lands, and direct consultation on all measures that would impact them (Carey 
2004, 72). While many Maya were in support of the referendum, a shocking number opposed it. 
According to Carey (2004) this can partially be attributed to evangelical influence in the region, 
who “warned against a return to Maya religious practices” (74). Evangelical pastors relied on 
various strategies to dissuade their congregations, including telling their congregants that a “yes” 
vote would plunge the country once again into conflict, as evidenced by the slogan “If you want 
peace, vote NO” (84). Given that the indigenous community was still deeply scarred, this was an 
effective strategy to employ.  
There are a number of reasons why Neo-Pentecostalism was attractive for indigenous 
Guatemalans. After the conflict in which their communities were destroyed and they were 
systematically massacred, a deep sense of pessimism towards political change set in (Gooren 
2002). They could control only themselves and their families. Evangelical Christians came to 
Guatemala during a crucial time, preaching to a people in the midst of a civil war and its 
aftermath. Their teachings appealed to a broad swath of indigenous Guatemalan society. This 
may help explain why bottom-up indigenous voices, such as those found in the Christian 
churches, did not articulate a radical vision of social change or strongly advocate for indigenous 
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rights. Rather, they drew their advocacy inward, focusing on problems related to the self and 
each individual congregation (Gooren 2002). Neo-Pentecostalism is friendly to neoliberal 
reform, and its adherents organized around small-scale business opportunities and the promise of 




























While both Colombia and Guatemala have strong grassroots voices articulating their 
respective visions for transitional justice, the two countries strongly differ in the mechanisms 
bottom-up groups use to articulate their demands. Various grassroots groups in Colombia have 
positioned themselves as antagonistic to the state, refusing to comply with the government’s 
development-oriented vision of peace. They often rely on non-institutional means to articulate 
their grievances, and radical land-based demands remain at the center of their vision of 
transitional justice. Guatemala, on the other hand, has taken a decisively non-radical approach in 
its bottom-up transitional justice endeavors. Grassroots indigenous groups in the country have 
focused on ethnic political inclusion, working to support a “neoliberal multicultural democracy” 
(Copeland 2011) that is firmly integrated within a hegemonic understanding of transitional 
justice.  
There are three primary variables influencing the differences between grassroots groups 
in Guatemala and Colombia. The first, and most influential, is how the nature of the conflict 
shaped demands. For Colombia, there was no one victimized identity around which to organize. 
The conflict was in many ways “democratic,” impacting all segments of society. As a result, the 
goal around which many marginalized groups could organize was access to land, encouraging a 
number of grassroots groups to radically contend with this objective. In Guatemala, however, 
ethnic identity was at the center of the conflict, and therefore there was a specific narrative with 
which to frame the peace accords. Rather than focusing on land distribution or inequality, both of 
which contributed to the conflict, the targeted nature of the violence encouraged grassroots 
groups in Guatemala to fight for political inclusion and ethnic recognition. The brutality of the 
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state in their response to previous indigenous-led radical demands discouraged bottom-up voices 
from pursuing them after the conflict.   
Colombia’s conflict was shaped by a battle for resources of a different kind than 
Guatemala’s. Colombia’s access to resources fueled the conflict in varying ways. First, coca 
production funded the guerrillas, allowing them to militarily expand and changing the nature of 
the conflict. It also invited new actors into the war, escalating paramilitary response and 
encouraging the formation of new criminal gangs. Colombia’s abundance of natural resources 
has also allowed the conflict to persist. Widespread extraction has led to displacement and 
continuing battles over land and its use. As a result, grassroots groups have made radical 
demands regarding who has access and autonomy over land. In Guatemala, it’s the lack of 
resources that have influenced how grassroots actors respond to post-conflict processes. Because 
indigenous groups in Guatemala lack financial resources, they have been forced to rely on NGO 
funding, which has limited their capacity to make radical demands and substantive change.  
The third variable to impact how grassroots groups in Guatemala and Colombia respond 
to transitional justice is religion. While Catholic Liberationists in Colombia were opposed to 
capitalism and dedicated to collective solutions, the Neo-Pentecostals in Guatemala were guided 
towards the free market. Religion and its associated communities are an important element to 
examine when studying bottom-up voices because churches help determine how citizenship is 
performed. In the case of Colombia, where liberation theology still influences political practice, 
adherents are opposed to capitalist extractivism and are willing to rely on radical means to 
prevent it. In Guatemala, where Neo-Pentecostalism is gaining influence, the pursuit of wealth, 
or at least financial stability, was a higher calling to serve one’s family. As a result of remaining 
fear towards the state and the attraction of controllable, personal growth, Guatemalan grassroots 
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indigenous groups in the region gradually adopted an evangelical interpretation of peace and its 
associated anti-radical practices.  
The comparison of Guatemala and Colombia demonstrates the importance of 
understanding how specific contexts shape grassroots actors and the mechanisms upon which 
they rely. The phrase “grassroots” is automatically considered to be subversive, incorrectly 
conflated with radical and anti-hegemonic. While grassroots groups in Colombia have positioned 
themselves as antagonistic to the state, Guatemalan grassroots groups have frequently been 
friendly to neoliberal reforms and largely non-combative. The differing nature of the countries’ 
respective conflicts can account for such radical disparities. Scholars and policymakers 
frequently make the mistake of assuming that the inclusion of bottom-up voices is sufficient to 
pave the way towards a lasting peace. Understanding the nuances of bottom-up approaches and 
interpretations to transitional justice is an important step in determining how grassroots actors 






















2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Guatemala. (2019). Office of Internatioanl 
Religious Freedom. 
The World Bank in Guatemala. (2021). The World Bank. 
Unidad para las Víctimas. (n.d.). Unidad Para La Atención y Reparación Integral a Las 
Víctimas. Retrieved April 22, 2021, from https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es 
World Report 2021: Colombia | Human Rights Watch. (n.d.). Retrieved April 8, 2021, from 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/colombia 
World Report 2019: Colombia | Human Rights Watch. (n.d.). Retrieved February 25, 2021, from 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/colombia 
ACLED. (2021). 10 Conflicts to Worry About: Colombia. 
Allison, M. E. (2016). The Guatemalan National Revolutionary unit: the long collapse. In 
Democratization (Vol. 23, Issue 6, pp. 1042–1058). 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2016.1159557 
Alsema, A. (2015). Historic Commission releases report on causes of Colombia’s conflict. 
Colombia Reports. https://colombiareports.com/historic-commission-releases-report-causes-
colombia-conflict/ 
Alvarez, S. E. (2009). Beyond NGO-ization?: Reflections from Latin America. Development, 
52(2), 175–184. https://doi.org/10.1057/dev.2009.23 
Arriaza, L., & Roht-Arriaza, N. (2008). Social Repair at the Local Level: The Case of 
Guatemala. In K. McEvoy & L. McGregor (Eds.), Transitional Justice from Below : 
Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change (pp. 143–166). Hart Publishing. 
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781472564405.ch-007 
Auty, R. (1993). Sustaining development in the mineral economies: The resource curse thesis. 
Routledge. 
Berman-Arévalo, E. (2019). Mapping violent land orders: armed conflict, moral economies, and 
the trajectories of land occupation and dispossession in the Colombian Caribbean. Journal 
of Peasant Studies, 48(2), 349–367. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2019.1655640 
Briggs, B. (2013). Guatemala, Genocide, and the Hope for Justice. Amnesty International UK. 
Caldeira, T. P. R., & Holston, J. (1999). Democracy and violence in Brazil. Comparative Studies 
in Society and History, 41(4), 691–729. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417599003102 
 60 
Campo Palacios, D., & Dest, A. (2021). Empty Seats and Full Streets in the Colombian Minga. 
NACLA. https://nacla.org/news/2020/10/23/empty-seats-and-full-streets-colombian-minga 
Carey, D. (2004). Maya perspectives on the 1999 referendum in Guatemala: Ethnic equality 
rejected? Latin American Perspectives, 31(6), 69–95. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X04270640 
Carmody, M. F. (2017). From Transitional to Posttransitional Justice: Continuity and Change 
after Democratization. Latin American Perspectives, 44(5), 210–215. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582x16683367 
Celis, L., & Furio, V. J. (2016). The legacy of liberation theology in Colombia: The defense of 
life and territory. Latin American Perspectives, 43(3), 69–84. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X16639270 
Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (1998). On economic causes of civil war. Oxford Exonomic Papers, 
50(4), 173–183. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203842256 
Copeland, N. (2011). ‘Guatemala Will Never Change’: Radical Pessimism and the Politics of 
Personal Interest in the Western Highlands. Journal of Latin American Studies, 43(3), 485–
515. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X11000411 
Dancy, G., & Wiebelhaus-Brahm, E. (2015). Timing, Sequencing, and Transitional Justice 
Impact: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Latin America. Human Rights Review, 
16(4), 321–342. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-015-0374-2 
Destrooper, T., & Parmentier, S. (2018). Gender-Aware and Place-Based Transitional Justice in 
Guatemala: Altering the Opportunity Structures for Post-Conflict Women’s Mobilization. 
Social and Legal Studies, 27(3), 323–344. https://doi.org/10.1177/0964663917718050 
Diaz, C. (2008). Challenging Impunity from Below: The Contested Ownership of Transitional 
Justice in Colombia. In K. McEvoy & L. McGregor (Eds.), Transitional Justice from 
Below : Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change (pp. 189–215). Hart Publishing. 
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781472564405.ch-009 
Edelman, M. (2005). When Social networks Don’t Work: The Rise and Fall and Rise of Civil 
Society Initiatives in Central America. In Social Movements: An Anthropological Reader 
(pp. 29–45). Blackwell. 
Espejo-Duarte, M. P. (2021). Drug-Trafficking in Colombia: The New Civil War against 
Democracy and Peacebuilding. Co-Herencia, 18(34), 157–192. https://doi.org/10.17230/co-
herencia.18.34.6 
Felter, C., & Renwick, D. (2017). Colombia’s Civil Conflict. Council on Foreign Relations. 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/colombias-civil-conflict 
 61 
Franz, T. (2016). Plan Colombia: illegal drugs, economic development and counterinsurgency - 
...: EBSCOhost. 34(4), 563–592. 
http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=6a1b48c3-53ed-4ae8-
a745-ed2ad4b67244%40pdc-v-sessmgr02 
Front Line Defenders. (2021). #Colombia. 
García-Villegas, M., & Espinosa, J. R. (2015). The geography of Justice: Assessing local justice 
in Colombia’s Post-Conflict phase. Stability, 4(1), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.gc 
Gomez Lizarazo, J. (1992). Colombian Blood, U.S. Guns. The New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/28/opinion/colombian-blood-us-guns.html 
Gooren, H. (2002). Catholic and Non-Catholic Theologies of Liberation : Poverty , Self-
Improvement , and Ethics among Small-Scale Entrepreneurs in Guatemala City. Journal for 
the Scientific Study of Religion, 41(1), 29–45. 
Gruber, B., & Pospisil, J. (2015). ‘Ser Eleno’: Insurgent identity formation in the ELN. In Small 
Wars and Insurgencies (Vol. 26, Issue 2, pp. 226–247). 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1007562 
Gutierrez, D. (2016). The Coming of Los Buendia: Colombia’s Peace Process and the Difficulty 
that Lies Ahead. Harvard International Review, 37(3), 4–6. 
Hatcher, R. (2009). Truth and Forgetting in Guatemala: An Examination of Memoria del 
Silencio y Nunca Más. Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 
34(67), 131–162. 
Historical Memory Group. (2016). BASTA-YA! Colombia: Memories of War and Dignity. 
http://centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2016/basta-ya-ingles/BASTA-
YA-ingles.pdf 
Hristov, J. (2005). Indigenous struggles for land and culture in Cauca, Colombia. In Journal of 
Peasant Studies (Vol. 32, Issue 1, pp. 88–117). 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0306615042000322402 
INDEPAZ. (2020). Macrocriminalidad con licencia legal. 
Isacson, A. (2019). Restarting Aerial Fumigation of Colombia Drug Crops is a Mistake. WOLA. 
https://www.wola.org/analysis/restarting-aerial-fumigation-of-drug-crops-in-colombia-is-a-
mistake/ 
Justice, I. C. for T. (2009). An Overview of Conflict in Colombia. www.ictj.org 
Kalyvas, S. N. (2006). The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge University Press. 
 62 
Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Transnational Advocacy Networks in the Movement Society. 
In D. S. Meyer & S. Tarrow (Eds.), The Social Movement (pp. 217–238). Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers In. 
Laurent, V. (2019). Colombia’s Minga Protests Demand Justice, but President Duque Isn’t 
Listening. NACLA. https://nacla.org/news/2019/04/16/colombia%27s-minga-protests-
demand-justice-president-duque-isn’t-listening-translation 
Legrand, C. (2003). The Colombian Crisis in HIstorical Perspective. Canadian Journal of Latin 
American and Caribbean Studies, 28(55–56), 165–209. 
Márquez, F. (2020). Hay una “política de la muerte” para asesinato de líderes. Semana. 
https://www.semana.com/semana-tv/semana-en-vivo/articulo/francia-marquez-habla-en-
semana-sobre-asesinato-de-lideres--noticias-hoy/690456/ 
McDonnell, P. J. (2018). Guatemala’s Civil War Devastated the Country’s Indigenous Maya 
Communities. Los Angeles Times. 
Mcevoy, K., & Mcgregor, L. (2008). Transitional Justice From Below: An Agenda for Research, 
Policy and Praxis. In K. Mcevoy & L. Mcgregor (Eds.), Transitional Justice from Below : 
Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change (pp. 1–14). Bloomsbury Publishing. 
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781472564405.ch-001 
McGregor, L. (2008). International Law as a ‘Tiered Process’: Transitional Justice at the Local, 
National and International Level. In K. McEvoy & L. Mcgregor (Eds.), Transitional Justice 
from Below : Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change. Hart Publishing. 
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781472564405.ch-003 
Montoya Londoño, C., & Vallejo Mejía, M. (2016). Law of victims and land restitution in 
Colombia: Public debates and “Glocal” agendas. Latin American Policy, 7(1), 80–105. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/lamp.12093/full 
Murillo, M. A. (2009). The 2008 indigenous and popular minga in colombia: Civil resistance and 
alternative communication practices. Socialism and Democracy, 23(3), 137–156. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08854300903180804 
O’Donnell, G. A., & Schmitter, P. C. (1986). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. 
Paige, A. (2009). How “transitions” reshaped human rights: A conceptual history of transitional 
justice. Human Rights Quarterly, 31(2), 321–367. https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.0.0069 
Pardo Abril, N. G. (2020). Memorialization and armed conflict: The construction of narratives 
for peace in Colombia. Revista de Estudos Da Linguagem, 28(1), 479–506. 
https://doi.org/10.17851/2237-2083.28.1.479-506 
 63 
Philpot-Munson, J. J. (2009). Peace under Fire : Understanding evangelical resistance to the 
peace process in a postwar guatemalan town. Maya in Postwar Guatemala: Harvest of 
Violence Revisited, 42–53. 
Pizarro, A. (1992). Revolutionary Guerila Groups in Colombia. In C. Bergquist, R. Peñaranda, & 
G. Sánchez (Eds.), VIolence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical 
Perspective (pp. 169–195). SR Books. 
Power, T. (2020). Massacres in Colombia Lay Bare Next Phase of the Conflict. NACLA. 
https://nacla.org/colombia-massacres-duque 
Rampf, D., & Chavarro, D. (2014). The 1991 Colombian National Constituent Assembly. 
Inclusive Political Settlements Paper 1. 
Restrepo, J., Spagat, M., & Vargas, J. (2004). The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict: A 
New Data Set. Homo Oeconomicus, 21(2), 396–428. 
http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Research.htm 
Reu, T. (2019). Leadership in the Mold of Jesus: Growing the Church and Saving the Nation in 
Neo-Pentecostal Guatemala City. In Journal of Latin American and Caribbean 
Anthropology (Vol. 24, Issue 3, pp. 746–762). https://doi.org/10.1111/jlca.12412 
Rios Oyola, S. M. (2017). The Local Church’s Defence of Human and Ethnic Rights in Chocó, 
Colombia. International Journal of Latin American Religions, 1(2), 309–330. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s41603-017-0028-z 
Rochlin, J. (2011). Plan Colombia and the revolution in military affairs: The demise of the 
FARC. Review of International Studies, 37(2), 715–740. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510000914 
Rozema, R. (2008). Urban DDR-processes : paramilitaries Medellin , Colombia. Journal of Latin 
American Studies, 40(3), 423–452. 
Rueda, M. (2020). Wave of massacres signals new chapter in Colombia’s conflict. The 
Washington Post. 
Sánchez, G. (1992). The Violence: An Interpretive Synthesis. In C. Bergquist, R. Peñaranda, & 
G. Sánchez (Eds.), VIolence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical 
Perspective (pp. 75–125). SR Books. 
Sankey, K. (2016). Communities Against Capital? Unravelling the Politics of Resistance to 
Colombia’s Agro-Extravtivist Project. 
Sarkar, R., & Sarkar, A. (2017). The rebels’ resource curse: A theory of insurgent-civilian 
dynamics. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 40(10), 870–898. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1239992 
 64 
Schmidt, L. (2021). Afro-Colombians Protest Violence and Government Neglect in 
Buenaventura | NACLA. NACLA. https://nacla.org/news/2021/03/11/afro-colombians-
buenaventura-ports-violence 
Schmidt, L. (2021). Afro-Colombians Protest Violence and Government Neglect in 
Buenaventura. NACLA. https://nacla.org/news/2021/03/11/afro-colombians-buenaventura-
ports-violence 
Sikkink, K., & Walling, C. B. (2007). The impact of human rights trials in Latin America. 
Journal of Peace Research, 44(4), 427–445. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307078953 
Tarrow, S. (1998). Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Updated 
an). Cambridge University Press. 
Teitel, R. G. (2017). Transitional justice genealogy. The Criminology of War, 2009(1997), 489–
514. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315086859 
Treaster, J. B. (1985). Death toll at 100 after rebel siege in Colombian city. The New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/1985/11/09/world/death-toll-at-100-after-rebel-siege-in-
colombian-city.html 
Vargas Meza, R. (1998). The FARC, the War and the Crisis of the State. NACLA Report on the 
Americas, 31(5), 22–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.1998.11722771 
Vogt, M. (2015). The Disarticulated Movement : Barriers to Maya Mobilization in Post-Conflict 
Guatemala. Latin American Politics and Society, 57(1), 29–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.l 
Waldmann, P. (2007). Is There a Culture of Violence in Colombia. International Journal of 
Conflict and Violence (IJCV), 1(1), 61–75. https://doi.org/10.4119/UNIBI/ijcv.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
